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One of the oddest features of legal education in the United States is the gulf 
between the “civil procedure” taught in the fi rst-year civil procedure course 
and the “civil procedure” students encounter elsewhere in the 1L curriculum. 
Every year, new law students learn how civil cases are litigated by studying the 
simplifi ed procedural system established by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.1 At the same time, students learn contracts, property, and torts 
from cases like Byrne v. Boadle,2 which were decided under procedural systems 
that have gone the way of the dodo. 
Without an understanding of the old procedural systems, however, the 
reader can be left in the position of a Game of Thrones novice who stumbles 
into a chat room fi lled with George R.R. Martin fanatics. As characters and 
procedural devices whiz past, the reader is left wondering which details matter, 
and which don’t. 
In an eff ort to help readers who fi nd themselves in this position, this essay 
introduces the forms of civil procedure used in those cases (“pre-modern” 
procedure, for convenience). Pre-modern procedure is easier to understand 
if one has something to compare it to, so I begin with an overview of modern 
civil procedure. I then introduce the central concepts and terminology of pre-
modern civil procedure, and close with an example.
I. Modern Civil Procedure in a Nutshell
Most 1L civil procedure courses are organized around the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, are used in
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1. See Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435-36 (1998) (describing how the Federal Rules came to dominate the 
fi rst-year civil procedure course in U.S. law schools). The Federal Rules’ dominance is 
not, however, total. For a casebook with unusually strong coverage of state procedure, see 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (11th ed. 
2015). See also Dave Hoff man, An Argument Against the Traditional Structure of the Civil Procedure Course, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 26, 2012), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/02/
an-argument-against-the-traditional-structure-of-the-civil-procedure-course.html.
2. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exchequer) (held: nonsuit error where evidence 
supported inference that defendant acted negligently, notwithstanding absence of direct 
evidence of negligence).
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federal district courts across the nation, and serve as a model for most states’ 
procedure systems.3 Thus, understanding the Federal Rules goes a long way 
toward understanding U.S. civil procedure in general.
The Federal Rules’ basic approach might be described as, “eh, let the trial 
judge work it out.” 4 Through a series of pretrial checkpoints, the Rules seek 
to sharpen the focus of a case and weed out cases where the plaintiff  (the party 
seeking to change the status quo) can’t prevail. Throughout the litigation 
process, the trial judge has wide discretion over the way the case is litigated.5
It’s easiest to understand this through an example. Suppose that plaintiff  
Catelyn Stark sues defendant Cersei Lannister for a tort—say, the wrongful 
death of her husband, Ned. The fi rst stage of proceedings under the Federal 
Rules focuses on the documents that Stark and Lannister fi le at the beginning 
of the case. Stark will fi le a complaint, which tells the court the relief she wants 
and usually identifi es the law that authorizes that relief.6 Lannister will respond 
by fi ling either a motion to dismiss (governed by Rule 12) or an answer (governed 
by Rule 8). 
The motion to dismiss permits the defendant to challenge the legal theory 
(or theories) that the plaintiff ’s complaint invokes. For example, if the state 
where Stark sued didn’t recognize a cause of action for wrongful death, 
Lannister’s motion to dismiss would point out that fact and argue that even 
if the facts alleged in Stark’s complaint are true, the case has to be dismissed.7 
Under the Supreme Court’s recent controversial decisions in Twombly8 and 
Iqbal,9 a motion to dismiss also permits the court to dismiss a claim if the 
facts alleged in the complaint don’t show a “plausible” entitlement to relief. 
In essence, these decisions hold that a complaint’s factual allegations (as 
opposed to legal boilerplate, arguments, and inferences drawn from the facts) 
must show a reasonable probability the defendant violated the law. 10 Thus, if 
Stark’s complaint alleged only that Ned had recently died, and didn’t provide 
any factual details suggesting that Lannister was responsible for his death, the 
complaint might be dismissed for failure to plead a plausible wrongful death 
claim.
3. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2014).
4. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure In 
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 962-63 (1987).
5. See The Bar & Grill Singers, The District Judge Song, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7_n2Dnz38y4 (“I’m a federal judge and I’m smarter than you—for all my life. I can 
do whatever I want to do—for all my life.” (to the tune of “Happy Together”)).
6. But see Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
7. See, e.g., R.J.R. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir.1989).
8. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
10. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 134-35 (2010).
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Once the court deals with any motions to dismiss, Lannister will fi le an 
answer that responds to the complaint’s allegations one by one. The answer 
can also introduce theories, called affi  rmative defenses, that show why Stark 
can’t recover even if the allegations of the complaint are true.11  For example, 
Lannister might allege that, although she killed Stark, she was justifi ed in 
doing so because he posed an imminent danger to public order.
After the answer is fi led, the parties exchange documents, answer written 
questions posed by attorneys, and sit for depositions—meetings in which an 
attorney takes the testimony of a witness under oath. This process is called 
discovery and is governed by Rules 26 through 37. Its goal is to provide both 
sides with all the evidence relevant to the case and permit them to settle 
without having to go to trial.12
When discovery fi nishes, Lannister13 will move for summary judgment. Under 
Rule 56, the court may dismiss Stark’s wrongful death claim if Stark can’t point 
to evidence that could be used to prove the claim at trial.14 Summary judgment 
may also be granted where a reasonable jury couldn’t rule in Stark’s favor 
based on the evidence developed in discovery15—for example, if a videotape 
demonstrated beyond question that Lannister wasn’t responsible for Ned’s 
death.16
When the parties have put on their evidence, the court may award judgment 
as a matter of law if there is only one way the jury could reasonably resolve the 
case.17 When judgment is entered, the losing side has the right to appeal under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. If the trial court’s judgment is not disturbed, it cuts off  
further litigation between the parties that arises out of the same “transaction 
or occurrence.”18
Of course, there’s more to civil procedure than the Federal Rules. But while 
subjects such as Erie and jurisdiction consume lots of time in the 1L procedure 
course, they’re not relevant here, because they rarely come up in the historical 
cases that appear elsewhere in the 1L curriculum.
II. Pre-Modern Civil Procedure
Thus we come to the main subject. What are the strange procedural devices 
that litter 1L casebooks like dead characters in a George R.R. Martin novel?
11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
12. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506-07 (1947).
13. Usually. See Samuel Issacharoff  & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts about Summary Judgment, 
100 YALE L.J. 73, 92 (1990) (pointing out that summary judgment is a “defendant’s motion”). 
14. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
15. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
16. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 17 (1982).
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A. Law vs. Equity
The fi rst thing to know is that there were not one but two procedural systems 
used prior to the creation of modern procedural systems: “common law” 
procedure and “equity” procedure. The reason has to do with the historical 
development of the English courts.
In the Middle Ages, the king exercised all the judicial and executive powers 
of government—and some legislative powers as well.19 There was no formal 
process for asking the king to resolve a dispute, so citizens who needed the 
state’s assistance appeared at royal court and petitioned for relief.
Around the 13th century, the fi rst courts of law evolved out of the king’s 
council. Instead of resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, the king’s clerks 
would issue a writ (or order) in the name of the king that directed a court to 
resolve a dispute in a particular way. For example, the “writ of right” directed 
the court to determine the owner of real estate by supervising a “trial by battle” 
between the competing claimants.20 W rits were customized to petitioners’ 
specifi c problems at fi rst, but became standardized over time. As described 
below, the writs came to defi ne a case’s “form of action,” which defi ned the 
kind of procedure the court would use, the kind of evidence the plaintiff  had 
to present to recover, and the remedies the courts would award.21
Despite the creation of the law courts, citizens continued to petition the king 
for assistance in cases that weren’t covered by an established writ. Meanwhile 
Parliament, jealous of its own authority, restricted the king’s authority to issue 
new writs.22  The king authorized his chancellor to resolve the leftover petitions 
that weren’t covered by an established writ. This eventually led to the creation 
of an alternate court system, the courts of equity, for cases where the courts of law 
couldn’t provide an adequate remedy. In the courts of equity, cases were tried 
by the chancellor or master of rolls, not a judge and jury.
19. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND xxv (1908). 
Cf. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Prods. 1975) (“[King Arthur:] 
The Lady of the Lake, her arm clad in the purest shimmering samite held aloft Excalibur 
from the bosom of the water, signifying by divine providence that I, Arthur, was to carry 
Excalibur. That is why I am your king.”).
20. The procedure is not quite as impressive as its name suggests. A party could “generally 
delay the action for a year and a day by betaking himself to his bed.”  FREDERIC WILLIAM 
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 21 (1936). 
Nevertheless, “care was taken to see that his excuse was not too unreal. Four knights were 
sent to visit him, to ascertain whether he had malum transiens or a languor—which was what he 
needed—after consideration of whether they found him vagantem per rura or ‘in bed as befi ts a 
man making such excuse, unbooted, unbreeched and ungirt, or even naked which is more.’” 
Id. 
21. See infra text accompanying note 28. For a helpful general survey of the common law writs 
and forms of action, see BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 
(Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923).
22. See id. at 60. 
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When reading an old opinion, it’s easy to tell whether the case was decided 
by a court of law or court of equity. The fi rst clue is the decision-maker. As 
noted, cases at law were decided by a judge and jury whereas equity cases were 
decided by the chancellor or master of rolls. The second clue is the name of the 
court. The two main common law courts were the King’s Bench and the Court 
of Common Pleas. The two main courts of equity were the Court of Exchequer 
and Chancery, a name that continues to be used in Delaware.23
The last clue to the kind of court is the remedy the court awarded. The 
prototypical remedy in an action at common law is money damages. Equity 
courts generally awarded injunctive relief—i.e., they ordered a party to do 
something or stop doing something.
All of these courts heard cases in London. But judges periodically would 
hear cases throughout England and Wales, in sittings known as assizes.24 If a 
diffi  cult question of law arose, it might be referred to the collected judges of a 
court who would hear it en banc, i.e., sitting together as a full court.25 Especially 
diffi  cult questions were sometimes heard by the twelve judges of the King’s 
Bench, Court of Exchequer, and Court of Common Pleas sitting in a kind of 
super en banc proceeding.26
B. Common Law Procedure
With the diff erence between law and equity in mind, we can turn to the 
procedural terminology used in old cases. Common law procedure is defi ned 
by three features, each of which generated its own terminology.27
1. The writ system. The fi rst feature of common law procedure is the writ system. 
As noted above, a common law case began when the plaintiff  obtained a writ 
from the king’s clerks that directed the defendant to appear and authorized 
a court to hear the case. The writ the plaintiff  obtained determined the case’s 
form of action—essentially, a bundle of custom and precedent that defi ned the 
applicable substantive law, the procedure the court would follow, the kind of 
evidence the plaintiff  had to produce to prevail, and the remedies the court 
could award if it found that the defendant violated the plaintiff ’s rights. 
23. At some points in its history, the Court of Exchequer also exercised jurisdiction over 
common law cases. See 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 238-40 
(1922). Thus when dealing with cases from this court, other clues should be examined to 
confi rm that the case arose in equity. 
24. For a vivid description of the assizes, see CHARLES C. COTTU, ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND; AND THE SPIRIT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 43 (1822): 
“The judges . . . enter the town with bells ringing and trumpets playing, preceded by the 
sheriff ’s men, to the number of twelve or twenty, in full dress, armed with javelins. The 
trumpeters and javelin-men remain in attendance on them during the time of their stay, and 
escort them every day to the assize-hall, and back again to their apartments.”
25. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *55-56.
26. See, e.g., King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202; 1 Leach 199, 200.
27. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 914.
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To appreciate the diff erence between a writ and a form of action, think of 
a baseball game. When the umpire proclaims, “Play ball!” at the beginning 
of the game, he directs the players to play a game of baseball. The rules that 
govern that game—its “form of action,” if you like—are not defi ned by the 
umpire’s direction to “Play ball!” but by the Major League Baseball rulebook, 
custom, and precedent. So too with writs and forms of action. Whereas a writ 
was the formal order that directed the case to go forward, the form of action 
was the body of law, precedent, and custom that defi ned how the litigants were 
to play the “game” picked out by the writ.28
Much of the confusing terminology in historical cases has to do with the 
form of action at issue, which, as noted, followed from the writ that the plaintiff  
obtained. Because Parliament had limited the king’s authority to issue new 
writs, a crucial question for the parties and the judge was whether an existing 
writ could be stretched to accommodate a novel fact pattern. For example, 
there was no cause of action for wrongful death at common law. Thus, in Stark’s 
lawsuit against Lannister, a judicial decision might focus on whether an action 
for wrongful death could be maintained through an action for “trespass”—the 
common law cause of action for injuries directly caused by the wrongful act of 
another.29 Common law courts devoted enormous energy to such questions, 
often reasoning in a style reminiscent of Monty Python’s Flying Circus.30
28. Maitland described the distinction as follows:
Let it be granted that one man has been wronged by another; the fi rst thing that he or 
his advisers have to consider is what form of action he shall bring. It is not enough that 
in some way or another he should compel his adversary to appear in court [through the 
appropriate writ] . . . [A] “form of action” has implied a particular original process, a 
particular mesne process, a particular fi nal process, a particular mode of pleading, of trial, 
of judgment. But further to a very considerable degree the substantive law administered 
in a given form of action has grown up independently of the law administered in other 
forms. Each procedural pigeon-hole contains its own rules of substantive law, and it is 
with great caution that we may argue from what is found in one to what will probably be 
found in another; each has its own precedents. 
 MAITLAND , supra note 20, at 1.
29. See Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.).
30. Compare Scott v. Shepard, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 526 (K.B.) (“[Defendant] is the person, who, 
in the present case, gave the mischievous faculty to the squib [a small fi rework, which was lit 
and thrown into a market]. No new power of doing mischief was communicated to [the squib] 
by Willis or Ryal [,who picked up the squib and threw it away in self-defense]. It is like the case 
of a mad ox turned loose in a crowd.”), with MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL, supra note 19:
Sir Bedevere: Tell me. What do you do with witches?
Peasant 1: Burn them.
Sir Bedevere: And what do you burn, apart from witches?
Peasant 1: More witches.
Peasant 2: Wood. . . . 
Sir Bedevere: Does wood sink in water?
Peasant 1: No, no, it fl oats! It fl oats! . . . 
Sir Bedevere: . . . Exactly. So, logically . . . 
Peasant 1: If she weighed the same as a duck—she’s made of wood.
Sir Bedevere: And therefore…
Peasant 2: ...A witch!
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Appendix I lists eleven forms of action at common law. Because the form 
of action identifi ed the theory of the case, the evidentiary showing that the 
plaintiff  had to make to recover, and the remedy the court could award, 
identifying the form of action at issue in an old case will generally make the 
case easier to understand. For example, if the court identifi es the case as one 
of “general assumpsit,” we know that plaintiff  is seeking to recover damages 
for the breach of a promise. The court’s analysis will probably focus on 
whether there is an enforceable contractual obligation, whether the defendant 
performed satisfactorily, or another issue that comes up in contract disputes.
2. The pleading system. The second feature of common law procedure was its 
elaborate pleading system. The common law pleading system sought to limit 
the number of issues in a case.31 Ideally, the exchange of pleadings would 
narrow the case to a single question that could either be decided by the court 
or put to a jury.
The basic moves in common law pleading are familiar from modern civil 
procedure, but the terminology is diff erent. For example, in Stark’s suit 
against Lannister, Stark would begin by fi ling a declaration—the equivalent of 
a complaint—that expanded on the original writ she obtained from the royal 
court with details such as the time and place of injury. Lannister would respond 
by making a plea that challenged either the legal basis for the suit or the facts 
alleged in Stark’s declaration.
A plea known as the demurrer (the second syllable rhymes with “fur,” not 
“cure”) performed a function similar to the modern motion to dismiss. It 
allowed the defendant to argue that the plaintiff  was not entitled to relief even 
if the allegations in the declaration were true.32 Thus, assuming a jurisdiction 
followed the old common law rule denying recovery for wrongful death, 
Lannister could obtain dismissal of Stark’s wrongful death suit through a 
demurrer which pointed out that, even if she killed Ned Stark, that fact did 
not support liability in tort. 
Another plea, the confession and avoidance, functioned similarly to a modern 
affi  rmative defense.33 Through this plea, Lannister could raise the argument 
that, even if she killed Ned, she was justifi ed in doing so. The traverse functioned 
like a modern answer and provided an opportunity for the defendant to 
contest the declaration’s factual allegations.34  Thus, Lannister’s traverse might 
contend that Ned died of natural causes, or that if someone cut off  his head, 
it wasn’t a Lannister.
Common law pleading diff ers most conspicuously from modern pleading 
in what happened after the fi rst round of papers was exchanged. Instead of 
launching into discovery, Stark would respond with another pleading (the 
31. See SHIPMAN, supra note 21, at 8.
32. See id. at 28.
33. See id. at 30.
34. See id. at 25.
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replication), to which Lannister would respond with another (the rejoinder), and 
so on. Through technical pleading rules, most of the potential issues in the 
case would be eliminated at the pleading stage, rather than being contested 
in later proceedings. The objective was to narrow the case to a single issue of 
law or fact that could be decided by a judge (if the issue was one of law) or 
jury (if the issue was one of fact).35  Many issues that would today be resolved 
later in litigation—who did what when, the appropriate theory of liability, the 
extent of damages, etc.—would, at common law, be decided on the basis of the 
pleadings. 
3. Trial and appeal. After the pleadings closed, any legal questions that 
remained would be decided by the court. Factual issues on which “issue was 
joined” would be decided by a jury. (Discovery was unavailable, and summary 
judgment was not introduced until 1855.36)
The fi rst-level trial court often was called the nisi prius court. After the parties 
put on their evidence, the defendant could move for a nonsuit or directed verdict.37 
Attorneys thought of the nonsuit as a demurrer directed at the trial evidence. 
Just as Lannister’s demurrer would have argued that Stark was not entitled 
to relief based on the facts alleged in the declaration because the jurisdiction 
did not recognize liability for wrongful death, her motion for nonsuit would 
have argued that Stark couldn’t recover based on the evidence introduced at 
trial. When there was only one reasonable outcome, the directed verdict device 
allowed the judge to dictate the jury’s verdict. For example, if all the witnesses 
testifi ed that it was a Tully and not a Lannister who killed Ned, the judge 
would direct a verdict for Lannister.
If the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lannister, Stark could move for a 
judgment non obstante veredict (JNOV)—literally, “judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.”38 Even though the parties had presented evidence, this motion was 
based on the pleadings. It permitted Stark to ask for judgment based on a 
feature of the pleadings that emerged during trial, notwithstanding the jury’s 
verdict for Lannister. The corresponding defense-side motion was the motion 
for arrest of judgment.39 All of these devices—the nonsuit, directed verdict, JNOV, 
and motion for arrest of judgment—have been consolidated in the modern 
motion for judgment as a matter of law.40
After the nisi prius court entered judgment, the losing party could appeal. 
Parliament took an active role defi ning appellate courts’ jurisdiction 
throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, so the forum in which an appeal 
35. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 916. 
36. See generally 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS: SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE § 3 (2014).
37. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal Rules 
of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 458 (2013).
38. See id. at 516.
39. Id.
40. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
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was heard varied over time.41  In general, appeal began by bringing an issue 
before the court en banc—i.e., before all of the judges of the court—and may 
have continued in an intermediate appellate court. A party who lost in an 
intermediate appellate court could pursue a further appeal to the House of 
Lords (the upper house of Parliament) in cases of exceptional importance.42
The appellate process began when the losing side obtained a writ addressed 
to the lower court. The appellate court would typically issue a rule nisi, an order 
that directed the party who won in the trial court to explain why the judgment 
should not be reversed or set aside.43 When the appellate court gave its decision, 
the rule nisi would be discharged if the party who won in the trial court (the 
appellee) successfully defended the judgment, or a rule absolute would issue, 
which converted the rule nisi into the appellate court’s permanent ruling. A 
rule absolute refl ected the appellate court’s decision that the trial court had 
erred in some respect, and that the outcome should be reversed or the case 
returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
C. Equity Procedure
Because the 1938 Federal Rules of Procedure were modeled on the equity 
procedure system, procedure in old equity cases is easier to follow than 
procedure in cases at common law.44 An equity case was initiated through a 
bill (like a complaint) that described the petitioner’s (i.e., plaintiff ’s) predicament 
at length.45 The respondent (defendant) would fi le a demurrer (like a motion to 
dismiss), a challenge to the legal suffi  ciency of the bill, or an answer, a response 
to the bill’s factual allegations.46
A central diff erence between common law and equity procedure was the 
evidence upon which cases were decided. Evidence in equity generally took 
the form of documents such as affi  davits. Even when evidence started out as 
oral testimony, it would be reduced to writing.
Perhaps more important, the parties could collect evidence through a 
process that resembled modern discovery.47 The chancellor or master of 
rolls would make rulings as evidence became available, and order additional 
discovery if he thought more information was necessary to resolve an issue. 
41. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 370-76.
42. See id. at 186-87.
43. See SHIPMAN, supra note 21, at 47.
44. For a useful general survey of proceedings in equity, with a focus on equity procedure in 
the United States, see BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING 
(1897).
45. See id. at 63-65.
46. See id. at 92, 94.
47. See Subrin, supra note 4, at 919-20.
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The ensuing proceedings sometimes lasted for decades, as famously described 
in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.48
Eventually, the chancellor would enter a decree that set out his decision. Juries 
were not used in equity, a distinction preserved in the Seventh Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which limits the right to a jury trial to suits at common 
law.49
Until the 19th century, Chancery had only two judges, the chancellor and 
the master of rolls.50 A losing litigant could appeal from the latter to the former. 
In cases decided by the chancellor, a litigant could only ask him to reconsider 
his decision or seek review in the House of Lords.
III. A Case Study
Having introduced the basic features of pre-modern procedure, I close with 
a case study that illustrates the value of understanding it. I take as my example 
Byrne v. Boadle, which introduced the idea of res ipsa loquitur to Anglo-American 
law.51 
As every 1L student learns, negligence means taking a risk that is 
unreasonable under the circumstances. The question in Byrne was whether a 
jury could infer negligence simply from the way the plaintiff  had been injured. 
The plaintiff  Byrne was walking down the street when he was struck in the 
head by a fl our barrel that fell from a second-fl oor window of the defendant’s 
shop. Because he had been clobbered by a fl our barrel, Byrne understandably 
could not testify about what was happening in the shop prior to the accident. 
Other witnesses confi rmed that a fl our barrel had fallen from the shop window. 
But, like Byrne, they couldn’t provide details about what was happening in 
the defendant’s shop before the barrel fell. As such, the jury didn’t hear any 
direct evidence that the defendant’s employees had been working carelessly. 
For all the plaintiff  and his witnesses knew, the defendant’s employees were 
working as carefully as brain surgeons.
After both sides’ witnesses testifi ed, the defendant argued “there was 
no evidence of negligence for the jury” and the trial judge agreed. The 
48. “This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive 
knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that 
no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for fi ve minutes, without coming to a total 
disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; 
innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. 
Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, 
without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the 
suit.”  CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (1853).
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of the common law.” (emphasis added)).
50. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 232-33.
51. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exchequer).
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judge “nonsuited the plaintiff , reserving leave to him to move the Court of 
Exchequer to enter the verdict for him with 50l. damages, the amount assessed 
by the jury.”52 In other words, the judge dismissed the plaintiff ’s claim but 
gave him leave (permission) to ask the Court of Exchequer to award him £50. 
The ensuing appeal turned on a procedural question: Had Byrne presented 
enough evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant’s employees had 
been negligent?
Byrne obtained a rule nisi directing Boadle to show cause why the judgment 
should not be reversed. The Court of Exchequer concluded that under the 
circumstances, the injury “spoke for itself:” res ipsa loquitur. The Court of 
Exchequer therefore converted the rule nisi into a rule absolute and reversed 
the trial court’s decision denying any relief to Mr. Byrne. Pursuant to the Court 
of Exchequer’s order, the unfortunate Mr. Byrne recovered his fi fty pounds.
The keys to Byrne are the trial judge’s nonsuit and the Court of Exchequer’s 
reversal of that ruling. The nonsuit expressed the trial judge’s view that the 
evidence Byrne off ered was insuffi  cient to show the defendant’s employees 
acted negligently. Reversing that ruling, the Court of Exchequer held that the 
evidence was suffi  cient to conclude that the defendant acted negligently. 
Byrne established the legal principle that some injuries show the defendant 
was negligent based on nothing more than the fact of the injury. When a fl our 
barrel falls from a shop’s second-fl oor window and clobbers a passer-by, a 
jury may conclude that the shop’s employees acted negligently even if no one 
testifi es about what the employees were doing prior to the accident. Or to 
take the modern analogue: When someone who recently had an operation 
fi nds a scalpel in her gut, a jury may reasonably conclude that the surgeon was 
negligent, even if what happened during the surgery is unknown.53
As this example shows, understanding pre-modern procedure makes it 
easier to understand the development of Anglo-American law. With a little 
procedural know-how, decisions like Byrne make a lot more sense.
52. Id. 
53. See Ripley v. Lanzer, 215 P.3d 1020, 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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The Eleven Common Law Forms of Action
Although there were many forms of action at common law, most were 
obsolete by the 19th century. The eleven forms of action listed below are 
particularly important for understanding cases in the 1L law school curriculum. 
ACTION DESCRIPTION
Trespass Action for damages directly caused by an unlawful 
act committed against the person or property of an-
other
Trespass on the Case Action for damages indirectly caused by the wrong-
ful act of the defendant. Precursor to modern ac-
tions for negligence and nuisance.
Trover Action for damages caused by the conversion (i.e., 
theft) of personal property
Detinue Action to recover personal property
Replevin Action to recover personal property in which plain-
tiff , after posting security, is permitted to take the 
property until the court renders its decision
Ejectment Action for a person who has been wrongfully eject-
ed from property to recover the property, damages, 
and costs
Debt Action to recover a liquidated or certain amount of 
money 
Covenant Action to recover damages for breach of a contract 
made under seal
Account Action to determine and recover the amount that 
a party in a fi duciary relationship (e.g., principal/
agent, attorney/client) owes to another party in the 
relationship
Special assumpsit Action to recover damages caused by defendant’s 
breach of an express contract
General assumpsit Action to recover damages caused by defendant’s 
breach of an implied contract or promise
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Some Popular Writs
“Original” writs were used to initiate a case, direct the sheriff  to compel the 
defendant to appear, and authorize the court to hear the case. For each of the 
eleven common law forms of action listed in the table above, there was a writ 
with the same name. When describing a case’s procedural history, courts might 
identify either the writ or form of action. For example, Pickle v. Page stated that 
a “writ of trespass”—shorthand for trespass on the case—permitted a plaintiff  
to recover damages “for a parrot, a popinjay, [or] a thrush” that the defendant 
abducted.54 Pierson v. Post, a case seeking damages for the defendant’s taking of 
a fox that the plaintiff  had almost captured, described the case as “an action of 
trespass on the case.”55
In addition to the original writs, litigants could petition for “extraordinary” 
or “prerogative” writs. These were used by courts to control the actions of other 
parts of government, government offi  cers, and sometimes private individuals. 
A few of the most common extraordinary writs are listed below. For a complete 
listing, see the current edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.
54. 169 N.E. 650, 651 (N.Y. 1930).
55. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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WRIT DESCRIPTION
Writ of error/appeal Writ issued by an appellate court to a lower 
court, directing that the record be delivered 
for appellate review
Writ of certiorari Writ issued by an appellate court, at its dis-
cretion, directing that the record be delivered 
for appellate review. Used today by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to bring up cases for review 
from federal circuit courts of appeal and state 
supreme courts.
Writ of habeas corpus Writ directing the respondent to “bring forth 
the body” of a detainee to examine the law-
fulness of the detainee’s detention
Writ of mandamus Writ issued by a court to compel an offi  cial 
to perform an action, usually because the of-
fi cial’s failure to act violates the law
Writ of prohibition Writ directing lower court or government of-
fi cial to cease acting beyond its lawful juris-
diction
Writ quo warranto Writ that directs the recipient to show why 
he or she is entitled to exercise authority she 
claims to possess, such as the offi  ce of mayor 
or sheriff 
Writ of supersedeas Writ directing a stay of proceedings at law, 
for example to permit an appeal
